

18 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DD/I (Planning)

SUBJECT: US Intelligence 1965-1970

REFERENCE: Your TS #172618, Same Subject

1. The discussion of US intelligence in the period 1965-1970 is of course an extremely difficult problem to deal with. In general, I have no quarrel with anything in the subject document. However, I have the feeling that the presentation is somewhat thin and that the President's committee may wish to come to grips with some more fundamental aspects of the problem. Perhaps when the material on Comint and the Clandestine Action Programs are included, the discussion will have the requisite amount of meat.


2. I think a key to the problem is the one you allude to in your Section II: Conclusion: it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of intelligence in the abstract. The period 1965-1970, especially in connection with the underdeveloped areas (China and Africa being the most important) will create very substantial problems for the US intelligence community. Whether we will in fact be in as good a position to deal with these problems as the general thrust of your report indicates, is something I am not very sanguine about. Perhaps some discussion of this problem and the attempts we are making to deal with them would be appropriate.

3. On page 2, paragraph C., you make an assumption that there will be a change in the Administration's policy which will result in an increase in the personnel strength of the intelligence community. Perhaps this assumption is justified on the basis of information of which I am innocent, but in any case, I don't think we should imply that an increase

in personnel strength will increase the effectiveness of our intelligence (I don't think it will). The emphasis should be on quality (along the lines that you make throughout the paper) rather than an increase in personnel strength per se.

4. One development which I think should be emphasized is the increasing reliance on overt, analytical-type intelligence and a decrease in the effectiveness and productivity of Clandestine (Spook-type) intelligence. This trend has been evident over the past several years and I think it might be worth noting - if we can get away with it.

5. Your Section VIII makes several good points with respect to the relationship of intelligence to policy at the Washington level.



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